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Abstract 
This paper argues that the agenda-setting power of protest must be understood in dynamic terms. 
Specifically, it develops and tests a dynamic theory of media reaction to protest which posits that 
features of street demonstrations – such as their size, violence, societal conflict and the presence 
of a “trigger” – lead protest issues to be reported and sustained in the media agenda over time. We 
conduct a unique empirical analysis of media coverage of protest issues, based upon a dataset of 
48 large-scale street demonstrations in nine countries. Time series cross-sectional analysis is used 
to estimate the dynamic effects of demonstration features on media coverage of the protest issue. 
The findings show that violence can increase media attention in the short-term and larger protest 
size sustains it over the longer-term. The agenda setting power of protest is structured in time.  
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It is widely recognised that media coverage significantly raises public awareness of political issues 
promoted by protest movements. As Lipsky (1986: 1151) once said: “if protest tactics are not 
considered seriously by the media … protest organizations will not succeed. Like a tree falling 
unheard in the forest, there is no protest unless protest is perceived and projected”. Koopmans 
(2004: 367) even goes so far as to suggest that: 
“…the decisive part of the interaction between social movements and political authorities is 
no longer the direct, physical confrontation between them in concrete locations, but the 
indirect, mediated encounters among contenders in the arena of the mass media….” 
It has long been argued that securing media coverage on protest issues is crucial for giving 
movement organizations’ social standing and validation (Gamson 1975). It provides them with 
“discursive opportunities” (Koopmans and Olzak 2004), that is, with an unrivalled opportunity to 
be heard. Yet despite the efforts of protest organizers, some protests fail to get reported. Why? 
Perhaps yet more importantly, what are the features of street demonstrations that not only secure 
coverage of protest issues in the first instance, but are also able to sustain it? 
Most of the knowledge that political scientists have gleaned about the relationship between the 
characteristics of demonstrations and a demonstration’s chance of securing media coverage is 
derived – either directly or indirectly – from protest event analysis (for reviews see Olzack 1989; 
Earl et al. 2004). This approach seeks to measure and interpret the frequency and characteristics 
of protests as reported in newspapers (and sometimes additionally in police records), often in 
cross-national perspective. It has enabled scholars to make huge advances in the development of 
theoretical approaches for the study of social movements (see, for example, Tarrow 1994), but has 
also led critics to question the possibility of deriving an objective account of protest incidence 
based solely on media reporting. Subsequent research into bias in media reporting of 
demonstrations has made it possible to gauge which types of demonstration do and do not secure 
coverage. It has been confirmed by numerous studies that there is an inherent bias in media 
reporting in favour of stories with news value (e.g. McCarthy et al. 1996; Smith et al. 2001; Earl et 
al. 2004). Amongst other things, it has been shown that large demonstrations associated with an 
otherwise mediagenic event (such as a major accident or an important international summit), which 
involve conflict between police and demonstrations, and which are promoting contested or 
politically salient issues, are more likely to secure coverage. These findings are not too surprising 
given newsgathering routines. It is known that the stories most likely to be published fit 24-hour 
news production cycles, are appropriate to newspapers audiences, reflect mainstream values or 
show some continuity with existing stories and have human interest and/or have strong visual 
imagery (Galtung and Ruge 1986; Bennett 1996; Shoemaker and Reese 1996). More generally, the 
media tend to favour “episodic” reporting of events (Iyengar 1991), and have a tendency to select 
negative information for consideration (Soroka 2012; 2014).  
Yet there are limitations to the extant knowledge base. Whilst we have clues as to which types of 
demonstration are most likely to gain media attention, few studies consider whether 
demonstrations can sustain coverage of protest issues over time. This is despite research indicating 
that dynamics of the reporting of protest events and issues over time are interesting and important. 
Seguin (2016), for example, found that past media attention increases social movement 
organisations’ chances of securing coverage in the future, and that social movement organisations 
can gain more coverage after a protest event as their representatives become viewed by journalists 
as spokespersons for movements. This notion resonates with Gaby and Caren’s (2016) concept of 
‘discursive eruption’, illustrated through a case study of Occupy Wall Street. Discursive eruption 
occurs in the aftermath of a protest once radical movement actors have created discursive 
opportunities that other organisations capitalise on them into the future.   These two studies have 
addressed the dynamism involved in the reporting of protest issues as a consequence of protest, 
but both have focused only on a single protest site or single issue rather than multiple protests and 
multiple issues. Although it is known that the media reacts in different ways in the run up to a 
protest event, at the time of the protest event and after a protest, to particular features of protests, 
little is known about how this varies across a variety of protest issues. Thus, in this paper we 
consider the question: what are the features of demonstrations on multiple issues that lead to 
protest issues being reported and sustained in the media over time? 
 
A Dynamic Theory of Protest and the Media Agenda 
The majority of applications of protest event analysis – even some of the most sophisticated ones  
– treat media attention as a static observation; as a count of news coverage demonstrations receive 
over a defined period of time (for a discussion, see Andrews and Caren 2010). Only a handful of 
studies incorporate a distinct temporal element to understand the relationship between protest and 
media coverage, and most of those that do are focused on media as a mediating variable rather 
than the outcome of protest. For example, Andrews and Biggs (2006) use event history analysis to 
trace the diffusion – through mass media, organizations and social networks – of sit-ins in the civil 
rights movement in the 1960s. Similarly, work by Walgrave and Vliegenthart (2012) and 
Vliegenthart et al. (2016) examines the relationship between protest and institutional agendas over 
time. All of these accounts seek to measure the effect of protest frequency on the broader issue 
agenda, again with media coverage being the mediating factor. The general implication of these 
studies is that higher levels of news coverage of protest activity lead to broader uptake of the 
related protest issue on the social and political agenda. While we know that there is a link between 
the incidence of protest and media attention (e.g. McCarthy et al. 1996; Smith et al. 2001; Earl et 
al. 2004; Maney and Oliver 2001) and we know something about the temporal dynamics of protest 
reporting for single issues (Gaby and Caren 2016; Seguin 2016), little is known about how media 
coverage of protests, and protest issues, is structured in time across multiple issues.  
Protest politics fundamentally concerns the struggle to draw attention to contentious issues and to 
mobilize support from other actors within the political system – akin to what Schattschneider 
(1960) famously called the “expansion of conflict”. Demonstrations are a political 
resource/strategy intended to be disruptive by shifting the focus and tone of the news agenda. The 
extent of this disruption might be limited to a change in the next day’s front page headlines and 
running order of television bulletins that is quickly forgotten, or extend over the weeks that follow 
to an escalation of media interest that attracts further coverage over time. Whether or not the 
discursive opportunities that are opened up by demonstrations persist over more than a short 
period is likely to determine whether they have lasting effects on the outcomes of political conflict. 
This matters because we know more broadly that media attention is skewed and subject to 
explosive shifts in focus, such that only a selection of issues get reported (Boydstun 2013). As 
discussed above, media coverage of social movement organisations has specifically been shown to 
exhibit positive feedback processes, producing “cascades of attention” (Seguin 2016). Street 
demonstrations can thus be conceptualized as shocks to the media agenda that unfold in different 
ways over time, either persisting or decaying. 
We are thus interested in whether the effects of demonstrations take the form of temporary 
“bounces” or more enduring “bumps” in media coverage of protest issues. Or do some elements 
of the shock to the media agenda decay more rapidly than others? These are questions about how 
media attention is sustained not only at the time of the demonstration, but in the weeks following 
it. This matters because the effectiveness of a demonstration is likely to stem not just from 
attracting headlines regarding the event in the next day’s papers, but also from leading to a 
sustained shift in media focus, onto the issues that the demonstration raises. It also matters because 
the mass media is an important channel for bringing about changes in public opinion and public 
policy (e.g. Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar 1991; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Soroka 2002; 
Walgrave et al. 2008).  
Although we know which features of demonstrations are associated with news coverage, little is 
known about the features of demonstrations that sustain coverage. And while we know that 
‘discursive eruption’ has occurred in newspapers’ discourses of inequality after Occupy Wall Street, 
we do not know whether this particular dynamic is generalisable to other protest issues. We draw 
on lessons from studies on protest coverage and political communication to develop hypotheses 
concerning how demonstration characteristics lead to different forms of media reaction over time.1 
 
Dynamic Effects of Protest on the Media Agenda 
The ways in which processes of conflict and attention-shifting can elevate an issue onto the 
political agenda is at the heart of agenda setting theories (e.g. Schattschneider 1960; Downs 1972; 
Kingdon 1984; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). Moreover, the way in 
which the media package news for consumption tends to favour episodic bouts of attention above 
sustained coverage of social issues and problems (see Iyengar 1991).  
Consider possible dynamic forms of media effect induced by protest activity. A public 
demonstration might produce a spike in news coverage during the week of the event, leading to 
increased attention to the issue, and then dissipate immediately, leaving no lasting imprint on the 
media agenda. Such a dynamic response would have no long-term consequence for political 
conflict on the issue. Alternatively, a large scale demonstration might lead to a permanent shift in 
the amount of news coverage dedicated to the issue in the weeks following it, contributing to a 
lasting increase in consciousness among political actors and citizens. Or the impact on media 
coverage might be graduated, slowly gaining in prominence over time or decaying after an initial 
spike in attention. Of course, the form of dynamic response might be a hybrid, combining elements 
of these processes. Indeed, Downs’ (1972) issue attention cycle and Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993) 
punctuated equilibrium theory are each premised on the idea that such shocks to issue attention 
may dissipate over time but still lead to permanent shifts in the long-term equilibrium. Boydstun’s 
(2013) model of news generation similarly identifies explosive shifts in attention that intersperse 
long periods of stability in the media agenda. 
                                                          
1 We do not differentiate here between expected differences in news media reporting of events, such as between 
television and newspapers (Lipsky 1968: 1152), though this clearly is a line for future research. 
Figure 1 displays a series of hypothetical forms of dynamic response of media coverage to 
demonstrations (drawing on Box and Tiao 1975). In time series models, these dynamic responses 
are termed “transfer functions” (discussed further below). The top-left panel depicts a situation 
where a spike in news coverage during the week of the demonstration is temporary, dissipating 
completely by the following week (a pulse intervention). The top-right panel, in contrast, shows a 
situation where that spike in news coverage persists in its entirety after the event (a step 
intervention). This implies that the demonstration leads to a permanent change in media attention 
to the issue. The bottom-left panel depicts a situation where the response of media to the 
demonstration is gradual, with attention to the related issue increasing or decreasing at a linear rate 
in the weeks following the event, for example as societal awareness grows or as new issues enter 
the agenda (a ramp intervention). Often, the dynamic response will combine elements of these 
forms: where some portion of the shock to media coverage of the issue persists, while other parts 
of it decay, leaving attention at a new equilibrium. This sort of hybrid is shown in the bottom-right 
panel. 
  
Figure 1.  Types of Media Effect 
 
 
Theoretical expectations  
As we noted, the conventional approach to analysis of protest agendas has been mostly concerned 
with static relationships. We here reflect on how factors relating to protest size, conflict, violence 
and the presence of trigger events may have dynamic effects on media coverage of multiple protest 
issues. It is well-established that larger demonstrations tend to attract more news coverage than 
smaller ones (e.g. McCarthy et al. 1996; Barranco and Wisler 1999). How might this play out over 
time? Large protests attract media attention due both to the value of spectacle for news reporting 
and the participation of particular groups or wider society which engages interest. When there is 
competition among news stories (Soroka 2012; Boydstun 2013; Bennett 2016), a large 
demonstration is more likely to generate news by attracting the interest of “gatekeeper” journalists 
and news outlets. We therefore anticipate that larger demonstrations will secure higher levels of 
attention for protest issues, relative to smaller demonstrations, during the immediate aftermath of 
the event. This is because news coverage will be temporarily attracted to the issue as a human 
interest story, consistent with Iyengar’s (1991) arguments regarding media bias towards news 
stories with “episodic” frames (i.e. news frames that are event-oriented) (as noted in Smith et al. 
2001 and Shoemaker and Reese 1996). However, we also would expect that large demonstrations 
– through signalling commitment and salience – produce an effect on media coverage that lasts 
beyond the short-term by raising awareness and popularising issues in wider debate. These 
“thematic” frames can alter understanding of social and political problems. Lastly, we would expect 
that in a crowded issue agenda (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Soroka 2012; Boydstun 2013), where 
the media is constantly searching for new stories and issues, this increase in coverage of the protest 
issues will dissipate, as media interest wanes and other events and issues become salient. These 
theoretical expectations inform our first hypothesis: 
H1: a higher number of demonstration participants will increase media coverage of protest issues in the 
immediate aftermath of the event leading to an increase over time that eventually decays.  
Past studies find that protest events involving conflict between different groups or actors are most 
likely to gain coverage (e.g. McCarthy et al. 1996; Smith et al. 2001). Such stories play into the 
hands of the journalistic norm of balance. As reporters strive to be objective, stories that present 
both sides “for” and “against” an issue are often prioritised (Boykoff 2007). This interest in conflict 
is consistent with more general negativity bias in news selection by mass media (Soroka 2012). A 
counter-demonstration might additionally lead to more media coverage of protest issues in the 
short-term, since this is typically indicative of broader social and/or political conflicts around 
issues of concern – and will often produce a captivating storyline for news coverage. Specifically, 
attention to issues is expected to increase in the immediate aftermath of such counter-protests due 
to the resulting “expansion of conflict” (Schattschneider 1960), but this may also be sustained in 
the weeks that follow the demonstration. Once an issue has become conflictual, it is more likely 
to be subjected to pack journalism, as reporters descend en masse on associated characters and 
events (Matusitz and Breen 2012). Since presence of a counter demonstration indicates highly 
contentious issues which are likely to attract attention more widely – due to the societal interest 
and their mediagenic nature – there should also be a lasting increase in media coverage. This 
informs our second hypothesis: 
H2: broader social and/or political conflict will increase attention to protest issues in the short-term and 
that increase will be sustained in the weeks following a demonstration 
Violent demonstrations tend to receive more coverage in the media (e.g. Barranco and Wisler 1999; 
Smith et al. 2001), attributable again to the episodic nature of media agendas (Iyengar 1991; 
Shoemaker and Reese 1996) as well as pointing to wider social and political conflicts around an 
issue. But how might violence impact the extent to which the media picks up protest issues – 
beyond coverage of the event itself (which is likely to have a relatively short-lived issue-attention 
cycle)? The powerful imagery of a riot can temporarily “authenticate the politically volatile 
content” (Bennett 1996: 337). In this sense it becomes a news icon, but one that only temporarily 
allows marginalized ideas to come to the centre of the news. Violence could have a counter-
productive impact on newspaper coverage in the medium-term, since it lacks consonance with 
existing socio-cultural scripts (Galtung and Ruge 1965) and makes the protest issue appear to 
threaten/disrupt the status quo (Smith et al. 2001). This dampening of media attention need not 
be permanent, but might be expected to temporarily depress the willingness of newspapers editors 
to give newspaper inches to an issue associated with illegitimate or riotous means. As Lipsky (1968: 
1152-3) argues, confrontational tactics might alienate allies or lead to the exclusion of protest 
groups from mainstream debate and bargaining – at least for the period of time in which the 
demonstrations are recent in observers’ memories. This leads to our third hypothesis: 
H3: higher levels of violence at demonstrations will increase the level of media coverage of protest issues in 
the short-term, but will depress it in the weeks following the demonstration. 
Lastly, association of a demonstration with a topical or high profile event might provide media 
with a convenient peg around which to organise their reporting of the protest issue (McCarthy et 
al. 1996; Shoemaker and Reese 1996). Events are also likely to be associated with press releases 
from official sources, known to be a major source of news (Gandy 1982). In the spirit of pack 
journalism, a major or unusual public event, such as a G8 summit or official state visit, ensures 
that media will already be covering the event and will be searching for related news stories (this 
opportunity structure is reflected in the highly controlled policing of major international summits). 
Consequently, a close link between a demonstration and some sort of prominent trigger event 
might temporarily elevate the level of media coverage of the wider protest issue – but this declines 
during the weeks that follow due to the episodic nature of the media agenda (Boydstun 2013). The 
next event befitting to a 24-hour news cycle will take its place unless there is a broader socio-
political conflict (see H2). This informs our fourth hypothesis. 
H4: the presence of a trigger event will increase media coverage of the protest issue in the short-term, but this 
effect will decay with time. 
Our expectations are summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1. Static and Dynamic Expectations of Media Coverage of Protest Issues 
 Static Dynamic 
Number of participants More coverage for large 
demonstrations 
More attention in the short-term (protest attracts 
news coverage), but also will lead to more attention 
in longer-term agenda by signalling commitment 
and salience of protest issue 
 
Social and/or political 
contentiousness (presence 
of a counter demonstration 
indicates multiple 
interests) 
More coverage for 
demonstrations on highly 
contentious issues 
More attention in the short-term as event adds to 
the storyline for news reports, but also increases 
media coverage of issue generally, i.e. 
social/political conflict attracts attention (in the 
Schattschneiderian sense)   
 
Exhibit violence More coverage for 
demonstrations where 
violence breaks out 
More attention in the short-term, but depresses 
coverage of the issue in the longer-term, i.e. 
potentially self-defeating (short-term gain but long-
term costs) 
Trigger event More coverage where 
there is a ‘trigger’ event 
relating to the 
demonstration, such as a 
G8 meeting 
 
More attention in short-term, i.e. coverage during 
the week of the protest/trigger event 
 
  
Data and Methods 
This analysis is based upon a dataset of 48 street demonstrations in nine countries, collected 
through the research project Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualising Contestation 
(www.protestsurvey.eu). The project is the first systematic cross-national survey of large-scale 
street demonstrations and collection of contextual data (on media attention and protest 
organizations), with data collected for demonstrations in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. These events all occurred during 
the period between 2009 and 2013, and provide for substantial variation across our dependent 
variable (see below).2 The demonstrations vary in size from around 500 to several hundred 
thousand participants, but each was a physical manifestation of protest that lasted at least several 
hours but no more than 24 hours.3 
                                                          
2 The Caught in the Act of Protest dataset includes over 80 demonstrations, but our final analysis is based upon a 
subset of 48 demonstrations. A number of cases are dropped due either to missing data on media attention or 
organisational characteristics. Demonstrations that lasted more than 24 hours (e.g. Occupy protests) were also 
dropped. We do not claim that our sample is representative of all demonstrations in Europe 2009-2013 (Anduiza 
and Cristancho 2011). However, the fact that the sample is constructed independently of a protest analysis is a huge 
advantage of our research. Studies on media coverage of protest are usually based on events reported in the media. 
In this study, a sample of large-scale demonstrations was derived independently from their status in the newspapers. 
Despite missing data, we are therefore confident that a broad cross-section of protests is covered. 
3 It is an advantage of our empirical design that our sample of protests is broadly comparable in terms of size and 
duration. Protest event analysis has viewed “gatherings of two of more people in which a visible or audible “claim” 
is made which, if realized, would affect the interests of some specific person(s) or group(s) outside their own 
numbers” (Tilly 1978: 275) as a unit of analysis. Thus, a 3-day vigil outside the White House is counted as one 
protest, but a daily two-hour picket repeated every day of the week is counted as several protests. We include only 
demonstrations that had over 500 participants, and which lasted from several hours to one day. Occupy London, for 
example, was excluded due to it having taken place over a period of longer than 24-hours unlike all other 
demonstrations in our dataset. 
Our investigation takes the form of time series cross-sectional data, where the dependent variable 
is the level of national media attention to the related issue over a sequence of time points and 
where each demonstration is a separate panel. This enables us to derive insights into the general 
structure of protest media agendas and variation across context. The dependent variable consists 
of a total count of newspaper articles mentioning the protest issue across a total of four newspapers 
per country: that is two main broadsheets and two main popular (i.e. tabloid) newspapers. The 
protest issue is broadly defined to capture the societal issues related to each demonstration as 
framed in the call to action. Up to five search terms were used for each protest issue across four 
newspapers: the two main quality newspapers and the two main popular newspapers (see the 
Supplementary Materials, Table S5 for further details of the newspapers analysed). For the 
National Climate Change March (2009), for example, the keywords reflecting the general issue 
were taken from the call to action. We searched for ‘climate change’, ‘global warming’, ‘climate 
emergency’, ‘dirty coal’ and ‘green jobs’. Note that this differs from the more episodic coverage of 
demonstrations themselves, which in data collection were searched for using the general search 
term in addition to the word ‘demonstration’ or ‘march’ (Klandermans et al. 2010). Keyword counts 
were conducted on a weekly basis for twelve weeks before the demonstration, the week of the 
demonstration and four weeks after.  
Our independent variables are the number of participants on a demonstration (we took an average 
of researchers’, police and organisers’ estimates of the number of people that attended the event, 
in order to reduce potential biases in assessments, see Biggs 2018); the observed presence of a 
counter-demonstration (using data collected by field researchers); the extent of violence (measured 
by field researchers) and the presence or absence of a trigger event (coded by senior researchers in 
each country team). See Appendix 1 for further detail of the coding and measurement of our 
variables. 
In addition, we include the following control variables: country, issue category and media tone.  
Country dummies (i.e. country fixed effects) are included because variation in media systems and 
cultures across nations could lead to differential levels of media coverage across cases. Regarding 
issues, past evidence from protest event analysis suggests that some protest issues tend to receive 
more media attention than others. The women’s movement is generally under-represented in the 
mass media, for example, whereas immigration and unemployment are generally more salient 
(McCarthy et al. 1996; Koopmans 2004: 371; van Zoonen 1992). Additionally, media tone is 
included to account for a potential weakness in protest event analysis, which fails to recognise 
whether the media is elevating a protest issue with positive coverage, or deflating it by reporting 
negatively. An outright negative tone is very easy to spot, since it involves portraying activists as 
“folk devils”. This involves representing them as mindless and/or violent thugs that are destructive 
and dangerous (Donson et al. 2004, see also Bennett 2003 on media reporting of anti-capitalist 
protest; see page 20 for the operationalisation of ‘tone’). 
Pooled time series cross-sectional analysis of this sort offers a simultaneous solution to 
understanding temporal dynamics and the role of context in whether or not demonstrations are 
able to influence the societal agenda. Further, the interaction of these contextual variables with 
transfer functions (i.e. pulse, step and ramp interventions) enables us to establish whether the 
timing of any effect was transient and limited to the week of the demonstration, led to a step 
change in the level of media coverage, or resulted in a temporary spike in media attention but 
decayed over time. This offers a novel dynamic approach to understanding the agenda-setting 
power of demonstrations. The design of our study is large-N (based on a sample of 
demonstrations, avoiding the tautology endemic to many studies of media attention to protest, 
which select cases based on their being reported in the media), at the same time as putting protest in context.  
 
 
 
 
 
The Media Agenda 
Consider the dependent variable of our study. We use the number of newspaper stories about the 
main issue(s) related to the demonstration over a 17 week period – which covers the full period of 
time for which the Caught in the Act of Protest project collected data. This includes approximately 
the three months (i.e. 12 weeks) before the demonstration, the week of the event itself, and the 
month (i.e. four weeks) following it.4 This provides a measure of the prominence of the related 
issue on the societal agenda. This time period has the advantage of observing the media salience 
of the protest issue well in advance of the demonstration, and after immediate coverage of the 
event itself has faded. We can therefore ascertain whether the effect of the demonstration on the 
media agenda persists, relative to its previous level, and beyond event-oriented episodic news 
frames (Iyengar 1991). By the end of the four week period following the protest, whether or not a 
protest issue is still the subject of news coverage – in competition with numerous other issues and 
stories – offers a good indication of the degree to which demonstrations leave more than an 
episodic imprint on the media agenda.  
Note that the time serial property of our data has important implications for the analysis and the 
sorts of inference that can be drawn. Firstly, data measured at successive points in time often are 
related, meaning that time series analysis must control for autocorrelation of the observations. 
Simply, the media agenda in week t is a function of the agenda in week t-1. Secondly, once the time 
dependence of our data has been dealt with, it is possible to determine whether the timing of a 
demonstration and its features, are associated with a transient or lasting shift in media attention to 
                                                          
4 Because of the composition of our dataset, our analysis of post-event media effects is limited to the four week 
window following the demonstration. While this prevents us from drawing inferences about the long-term impact 
on the societal agenda, it remains possible to determine whether or not the media footprint of the event lasted 
substantially beyond the day of the event. Because most news reporting of demonstrations tends to be concentrated 
on the day of the event, or the day after, we believe this four week period has face validity as a measure of the post-
event media agenda. 
an issue. Thirdly, because we have a large number of identically constructed media agenda 
timelines, it is possible to consider both the general structure of media agendas for large-scale 
demonstrations and variation due to context – such as features of the demonstration and its 
policing, its organization, or differences across issues or countries. The media timeline for each of 
the 48 demonstrations are plotted in Figure 2 (see Appendix 2 for the list of demonstrations and 
their ID number).5 Visual inspection of the data suggests that these media agendas exhibit similar 
features – with many exhibiting a distinct spike or step in the week of the protest, often decaying 
thereafter – but with variation across cases too.  We discuss two contrasting cases (demonstrations 
15 and 28) towards the end of our results section. 
 
Figure 2. Media Agendas in 48 Large-Scale Demonstrations  
 
                                                          
5 For purposes of comparison across demonstrations, the number of newspaper articles is standardised within cases 
(allowing us to use a common y-axis for the figure). Our time series cross-sectional analysis uses the untransformed 
number of news articles as the dependent variable. 
Time Series Cross-Sectional Analysis 
In the analysis that follows, we undertake time-series cross-sectional analysis of media attention to 
issues associated with large-scale demonstrations. We first model the dynamic character of protest 
media agendas on a week-by-week basis using pulse, step and ramp transfer functions. This allows 
us to better understand the temporal structure of media attention to issues that are elevated to the 
societal agenda by large-scale demonstrations. We then proceed to develop a dynamic model of 
the media agenda that considers effects of the transfer functions for demonstration size (H1), 
presence of a counter-demonstration (H2), aggressiveness of protestors and the police (H3) and 
the presence of a trigger event (H4).  
 
The Dynamics of Media Coverage of Protest Issues  
To first examine the dynamic properties of the media agenda on a week-by-week basis, a time 
series cross-sectional first order autoregressive, AR(1), model is estimated for media attention to 
protest issues associated with 48 demonstrations (i.e. panels). This model specification has the 
advantage of controlling for temporal persistence of media coverage, while estimating its common 
structure across all demonstrations.6 The full model takes the form:  
MEDIAit = α0* + β1*PULSEit + β2*STEPit + β3*RAMPit  
+ β4*TRIGGERi  
+ β5*TONEi  
+ β6*ISSUEi  
+ β7*COUNTRYi  
+ μit
 
                                                          
6 Prior to modelling, the dependent variable (i.e. the media agenda for each demonstration) was tested for the 
presence of unit root in the panel data using a Fisher-type (Choi 2001) test. Based on the combined p-values of 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of individual panels (at three lags) this rejects the null hypothesis that all panels 
contain a unit root at the 95 per cent confidence level. Data are therefore modelled in level form rather than in first 
differences.  
Where MEDIAit refers to the number of newspaper stories related to the general issue of a given 
demonstration i at time t, α*0 represents the intercept, with a series of dynamic responses: where 
PULSEit refers to the temporary change in the media agenda during the week of the demonstration, 
STEPit refers to the permanent change from the week following the demonstration onwards, and 
RAMPit refers to a gradual trend capturing a linear increase or decrease in attention from the week 
following the demonstration.7 This instantaneous timing of the pulse intervention and lagged 
timing of the step and ramp interventions enables us to determine whether there is an initial change 
in the media agenda before transition to a new longer-run state. The model includes a control for 
whether the general tone of media coverage is positive or negative (TONEi), coded by the research 
team on a scale from 1 where media coverage is largely positive and 7 where it is largely negative.  
The model is estimated with panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995), which controls 
for panel heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlations of the errors. The latter is especially 
important to control for given the data we are using because some of the demonstrations relate to 
the same issue (i.e. where demonstrations were held in parallel in multiple countries), while 
demonstrations on unrelated issues occurred during an overlapping time period. The model is 
fitted with the Prais-Winsten method to test for serial autocorrelation (μit), with the rho estimated 
separately for each panel as the first-order autoregressive process: μit = ρμit-1 + εit. This allows the 
rate of persistence to vary across units (i.e. panels) consistent with the expectation that persistence 
of the media agenda will vary on a demonstration-by-demonstration basis, reflecting features 
distinct to particular local contexts. Country- (COUNTRYi) fixed effects are included to allow the 
mean level of media attention to vary national media, while issue-level (ISSUEi) fixed effects are 
                                                          
7 Where the week of the demonstration is t=0, PULSEij is defined such that: 𝑥𝑡 = {
0, 𝑡 ≠ 0
1, 𝑡 = 0
 , STEPij is defined 
such that 𝑥𝑡 = {
0, 𝑡 < 1
1, 𝑡 ≥ 1
,  and RAMPij is defined such that 𝑥𝑡 = {
0, 𝑡 < 1
𝑡, 𝑡 ≥ 1
. 
included for the full model.8 In the absence of directly comparable cross-national survey measures 
of public opinion, the latter provide a measure of the salience of each type of protest issue.9 The 
results of the baseline models, including the individual functional forms without controls (i.e. issue 
fixed-effects and tone), and the full model (with and without controls) are presented in Table 2.  
Table 2. The Dynamics of Media Coverage of Protest Issues 
 MEDIAit 
PULSEij -5.64   13.77 13.71 
 (10.92)   (13.00) (12.97) 
STEPij  20.08  71.55 72.55 
  (15.61)  (20.85)** (20.73)** 
RAMPij   -2.54 -22.33 -22.46 
   (6.94) (6.55)** (6.52)** 
TONEi     8.44 
     (8.81) 
ISSUE1i: Economic     7.28 
     (49.32) 
ISSUE2i: Environment     28.25 
     (49.83) 
ISSUE3i: Rights     53.45 
     (47.41) 
ISSUE4i: Other     40.23 
     (46.52) 
Intercept 86.71 82.00 86.11 82.59 28.61 
 (21.59)** (23.45)** (21.71)** (20.94)** (61.82) 
R2 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 
Panels 48 48 48 48 48 
N 816 816 816 816 816 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; Note: the reference category for issue type is those demonstrations that relate to peace. 
 
                                                          
8 Demonstration issues are aggregated into five categories from the Caught in the Act dataset: economic (anti-
austerity, labour issues), environment (climate change, nuclear), rights (democracy, LBGT, minorities, women), 
peace (peace) and other (culture, regional, students, other). Country fixed effects, treating the UK as the reference 
category, are omitted from the results but are available in the supplementary materials.  
9 As a robustness check, we also tested for the effect of political system characteristics on the level of media 
attention. This suggests that federal systems (Belgium, Germany, Switzerland) exhibit less attention to protest issues, 
but inclusion of this control does not improve the model fit at all (i.e. the R-squared remains unchanged and none 
of the effects change substantively). If the political system variable is included instead of the country variables, the 
model fit drops substantially, indicating that there is more variation within systems than across them. 
Our findings suggest a distinct pattern of the dynamic response of media coverage of protest issues 
to occurrence of a large-scale street demonstration. The baseline models including the individual 
transfer functions do not find significant effects for the pulse, step and ramp interventions. More 
importantly, however, the step and ramp functions are significant when included in combination. 
This illustrates the importance of testing for alternative functional forms: if the dynamic response 
of the media agenda takes the form of a level-increase followed by a decay, the linear form of step 
or ramp interventions will not adequately fit the underlying data (as the baseline models confirm).10 
In the full model, the positive and significant effect for the STEPij intervention indicates there is 
an increase of 72.6 in the average number of newspaper stories about the issue that persists in the 
period following the week of the demonstration. The negative and significant effect of the RAMPij 
intervention indicates that news coverage of the protest issue declines by 22.5 newspaper stories a 
week over the final four weeks of the media timeline. Notably, the PULSEij intervention is not 
significant, indicating that while the event is associated with a step-shift and gradual decay in 
attention, no portion of the shock is entirely temporary (at least for the period in question). Note 
that the Caught in the Act project also collected a ‘protest event analysis’ measure that required a 
specific reference to the ‘protest’, ‘rally’ or ‘demonstration’. If the dynamic response of this media 
agenda is modelled, we find a significant pulse intervention – suggesting that this ‘episodic’ framing 
precedes broader shifts in attention to protest issues. Our findings on the shape of dynamic 
responses of the media agenda are of substantive importance, since they are consistent with the 
expectation that large-scale public demonstrations can have a lasting effect in elevating issues onto 
                                                          
10 By their construction, the step and ramp functions are highly collinear as are (consequently) their interactions. 
This is common when testing competing functional forms, and we do not consider it problematic for specification 
of the models reported in either Table 2 or 3 (a feature of multicollinearity is that it increases the standard errors of 
coefficients, so reduces the likelihood of finding significant effects). 
the agenda, even if their half-life in news terms remains quite short before other issues displace 
them.11  
 
Figure 3. Predicted Level of Media Coverage  
 
In Figure 3 we present the overall margin, which predicts the level of media coverage (i.e. the total 
count of newspaper articles mentioning the protest issue) for each week of the timeline, holding 
all variables in the model constant. The estimates are stable for the first twelve weeks as there is 
no variation in the dynamic transfer functions. During the week of the demonstration itself (t=0), 
the initial increase in predicted media coverage is relatively small, peaking instead the following 
                                                          
11 While the length of the time series for each of the demonstrations (i.e. panels), T=17, limits the possibility for 
analysis of individual cases, if an AR(1) model is estimated with pulse, step and ramp interventions, the step and 
ramp effects are signed in the same direction in 35 out of 48 cases (and are significant at the 95 per cent confidence 
level in 10 out of those 35 cases). This general pattern therefore appears to hold across the majority of cases. 
week (t=1). After this time point, the amount of media coverage declines. This pattern of dynamic 
response is consistent with the idea of an issue attention cycle in media coverage of protest issues. 
 
The Dynamics of Contextual Effects on Media Coverage of Protest Issues 
We next consider features of demonstrations that might influence the level of newspaper coverage 
received by the general issue on which demonstrations focus. As we hypothesized, we expect 
demonstration size, the presence of a counter-demonstration, the behavior of demonstrators and 
the police, and the presence of a trigger event will influence the amount of news coverage of 
protest issues. Alone this offers a static test of whether the protest context (e.g. the scale of the 
demonstration, level of issue conflict, and the aggression of police and demonstrators) is associated 
with more or less news coverage both before and after the event. Because these features are located 
in time it is also essential to consider whether these contextual factors matter more (or less) during 
the week of the demonstration and/or afterwards. For this reason, we consider interaction of these 
contextual variables with our transfer functions, as described above. This model can be expressed: 
MEDIAit = α0* + β1*PULSEij + β2*STEPij + β3*RAMPij
 
+ β4*SIZEi + β5*(SIZEi × PULSEij) + β6*(SIZEi × STEPij) + β7*(SIZEi × RAMPij)  
+ β8*COUNTERi + β9*(COUNTERi × PULSEij) + β10*(COUNTERi × STEPij) + β11*(COUNTERi × RAMPij) 
+ β12*DEMPOLi + β13*(DEMPOLi × PULSEij) + β14*(DEMPOLi × STEPij) + β15*(DEMPOLi × RAMPij) 
+ β16*TRIGGERi + β17*TONEi + β18*ISSUEi + β19*COUNTRYi + μit
 
 
Where, in addition to the baseline model introduced earlier, SIZEi refers to the estimated size of 
the demonstration (with our standardized measure calculated from the average of organizer, police 
and fieldwork researcher estimates, measured in thousands), DEMPOLi refers to the aggression 
of police and demonstrators during the demonstration (initially coded separately as equal to 1 for 
“not at all”, 2 for “not very much”, 3 for “somewhat”, 4 for “quite” and 5 for “very much”, and 
then added together to create a combined measure which is also standardized), and COUNTERi 
refers to the presence of a counter-demonstration on the day (coded as equal to 1 if there was a 
counter-demonstration and 0 if there was not). TRIGGERi indicates presence of a trigger event, 
coded as equal to 1 if there was a direct event causing the demonstration to take place at that 
specific point in time and 0 if there was not. 
Further, the interaction terms in the model enable us to determine whether those contextual 
factors had a specific effect in the week proximate to the demonstration or in the four weeks 
following it, serving to either amplify or dampen the level of newspaper coverage. This is important 
because it allows the dynamic form of the effect to vary, providing further insight into whether 
contextual effects persist or dissipate after a protest. Specifically, the shape of dynamic response 
may take the form of a pulse (PULSEij), step (STEPij) or ramp (RAMPij) effect. For example, the 
SIZEi × PULSEij parameter captures the temporary effect (t=1) of the size of the demonstration, 
while the SIZEi × STEPij parameter indicates its persisting effect on media coverage (t>1). 
The results for the models of dynamic effects of protest context are reported in Table 3. These 
provide important insights regarding our theory of the dynamics of protest media coverage. Firstly, 
the interaction of the pulse intervention and the size of the demonstration (SIZEi × PULSEij) 
indicates that larger demonstrations tend to increase the amount of media coverage in the week of 
the event; the coefficient is equal to 23.74 (p<0.01), meaning that a one-unit standard deviation 
increase in the number of people who attended the demonstration is associated with approximately 
24 additional newspaper stories in the week of the protest. In unstandardized terms, around 5,000 
additional protestors lead to one extra newspaper story in the week of the protest. Given that the 
mean size of demonstration for our cases was equal to around 39,000 people, this represents a 
meaningful effect. The positive and significant interaction of demonstration size with the step 
intervention (46.87, p<0.01) further reveals that larger demonstrations tend to have a sustained 
effect on the level media attention, while the negative and significant effect of the interaction with 
the ramp intervention (-15.14, p<0.01) indicates that this effect fades over time. Secondly, turning 
to presence of a counter-demonstration, the negative and significant interaction (-75.41, p<0.05) 
with the step intervention (COUNTERi × STEPij) shows that the level of attention to the protest 
issues falls in the weeks following the protest. Substantively, this means there are 75.4 fewer 
mentions of the protest issue in newspaper coverage during weeks after the event. The interaction 
with the ramp intervention (26.93, p<0.05) indicates that this attention gradually rebounds, such 
that the original equilibrium has been restored after a few weeks. Thirdly, the pulse interaction for 
combined measure of police/protestor aggressiveness (13.67, p<0.05) shows that demonstrations 
subject to greater conflict receive more attention in the week of the event, but the step intervention 
reveals a negative effect (-23.72, p<0.05), meaning that there is subsequently a fall in the average 
level of media attention to the issue. The positive and significant ramp intervention (8.66, p<0.01) 
indicates that the level of media attention then grows again. Fourthly, and finally, the negative and 
significant ramp intervention (-23.49, p<0.05) indicates that media coverage tends to decline more 
quickly for demonstrations associated with a trigger event. Compared to events where there was 
not a trigger, there are 23.5 fewer newspaper mentions of the protest issue per week.  
  
Table 3. Dynamic Model of Contextual Predictors on Media Coverage of Protest Issues 
 MEDIAit 
PULSEij  16.73 7.25 
  (13.46) (7.34) 
STEPij  73.08 54.74 
  (21.74)** (11.03)** 
RAMPij  -21.91 -13.65 
  (6.82)** (3.68)** 
TONEi  10.01 15.41 
  (10.77) (13.94) 
SIZEi  2.26 -0.18 
  (5.29) (4.16) 
COUNTERi  65.55 72.25 
  (10.75)** (18.10)** 
DEMPOLi  27.28 26.37 
  (6.85)** (7.81)** 
TRIGGERi  -7.00 -3.99 
  (20.08) (23.29) 
SIZEi * PULSEij   23.74 
   (7.44)** 
SIZEi * STEPij   46.87 
   (11.41)** 
SIZEi * RAMPij   -15.14 
   (3.64)** 
COUNTERi * PULSEij   -22.00 
   (21.89) 
COUNTERi * STEPij   -75.41 
   (35.55)* 
COUNTERi * RAMPij   26.93 
   (10.54)* 
DEMPOLi * PULSEij   13.67 
   (5.99)* 
DEMPOLi * STEPij   -23.72 
   (9.25)* 
DEMPOLi * RAMPij   8.66 
   (3.05)** 
TRIGGERi * PULSEij   19.75 
   (23.20) 
TRIGGERi * STEPij   55.83 
   (38.03) 
TRIGGERi * RAMPij   -23.49 
   (11.40)* 
ISSUE1i: Economic  4.12 -6.71 
  (49.23) (45.29) 
ISSUE2i: Environment  24.01 14.38 
  (48.85) (46.83) 
ISSUE3i: Rights  29.36 19.60 
  (49.50) (46.41) 
ISSUE4i: Other  -6.08 -21.05 
  (45.74) (42.45) 
Intercept  -40.16 -40.63 
  (71.53) (79.36) 
R2  0.44 0.45 
Panels  48 48 
N  816 816 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; Note: the reference category for issue type is those demonstrations that relate to peace. 
 
 
 
  
We can again plot the marginal effect of each of the contextual predictors (i.e. demonstration size, 
presence of a counter-demonstration, police/protestor aggressiveness and presence of a trigger 
event) on the total count of newspaper articles mentioning the protest issue over time. In Figure 
4 we present the marginal effects over the six weeks starting from the week before the protest (t=-
1), which indicate the linear combination of the base effect and the pulse, step and ramp 
interventions. The estimates provide support to the inferences drawn from Table 3. From the 
upper-left panel, it is evident that the size of demonstration has an immediate impact on level of 
media attention (t=0), followed by a further increase in the week after (t=1) and then a gradual 
decline in the remaining time period. This is as we hypothesized in H1. The upper-right panel 
indicates that the short-term effect of presence of a counter-demonstration is, in contrast, to 
reduce the level of media coverage (at both t=0 and t=1), before it slowly rebounds. This does not 
quite fit the expected pattern for broader social/political conflict, set out in H2, which expected a 
more immediate increase in media coverage of the protest issue. The pattern for the perceived 
level of aggressiveness of police and demonstrators, shown in the bottom-left panel is perhaps 
most interesting. This sees an immediate rise in media coverage during the week of the protest 
(t=0), followed by a fall in attention the week after (t=1), before media attention increases gradually 
over subsequent weeks. This is consistent with H3, where the short-term agenda expansion due to 
violent protest comes at the cost of longer-term dampening of attention, before news coverage of 
the protest issue is eventually restored to close to its original equilibrium. Finally, the combined 
marginal effect for presence of a trigger event, shown in the bottom-left panel, reveals this is largely 
indistinguishable from zero throughout the period, although the effect does decay with time after 
the protest (from t=1 onward). The absence of a temporary increase in media coverage during the 
week of the demonstration leads to partial rejection of H4, but importantly the effect decays as 
predicted. 
 
  
Figure 4. Marginal Effect of Predictors on Media Coverage of Protest Issues  
 
 
A comparison of the media effects of two demonstrations 
 
We further illustrate our findings with reference to two demonstrations with significantly different 
types of media effect from the Climate Change Demonstration in Utrecht (2010, protest 15) and 
the 1st May Demonstration in Barcelona (2010, protest 28) (see panels in Figure 2). Both have a 
hybrid effect, but this manifests in different ways for the two issues. In relation to the climate 
change demonstration, attention to climate change tails off after a small peak, going from 20 
newspaper articles at 10-weeks before the demonstration to 34 articles during the week of the 
demonstration and down to only 14 articles four-weeks after. In contrast, attention to social justice 
issues is higher in the aftermath of the 1st May demonstration (178 newspaper articles four-weeks 
after) compared to the week of the demonstration (99 articles).  
We selected these two demonstrations for comparison because, in addition to having different 
media trajectories, they are similar in many other respects: both were supported by a significant 
and well-established social movement sector active in protest and both were part of a broader cycle 
of action (but with no other significant mobilisations in the 4-weeks after each protest). There 
have been fairly regular protests on these two issues over the past 10 years in the respective 
countries. In this way, we have a measure of control over ‘media cascades’ (Seguin 2016). The two 
demonstrations are also similar in terms of the behaviour of police and demonstrators. For both 
demonstrations, the police were somewhat cheerful and not at all aggressive, whereas the 
demonstrators were not very cheerful and fairly disorderly.  
Yet there are also some important differences. The 1st May event was a march through the centre 
of Barcelona, attracting approximately 8,300 protesters. Although it was a fairly large 
demonstration, it was smaller than expected because of poor weather.  The climate demonstration 
in Rotterdam was a combination of a demonstration and festival – there were film screenings, 
presentations and stalls. It attracted approximately 4,200 protesters.  It was timed to coincide with 
the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP15), which we would classify as a trigger 
event. The 1st May demonstration did not have a similar coincidental trigger event. The protests 
also differed in terms of anticipated violence. In Spain, demonstrations for social justice frequently 
turn violent, whereas climate change demonstrations in The Netherlands are mostly peaceful.  
We hypothesized that protests focused on socially and politically contentious issues and those with 
a trigger event might increase attention to protest issues, but our case studies corroborate the 
rejection of these hypotheses. Climate change is highly contested and the demonstration was 
organised specifically to coincide with a trigger event (COP15), and yet attention to climate change 
tails off in the aftermath of the protest. The 1st May demonstration did not have a trigger event 
and yet managed to sustain media attention in the longer term. 
Our hypotheses on violence and demonstration size are supported, however. The threat of violence 
at the 1st May demonstration might have led to the small increase in coverage of social justice in 
week 0, but the absence of violence itself perhaps allowed coverage of social justice to be sustained 
over time. Moreover, the Barcelona demonstration was almost twice as large as the Utrecht one. 
Our quantitative findings and qualitative comparison both illustrate the importance of protest size 
in sustaining attention to protest issues in the longer-term. 
 
Conclusions 
Media coverage is highly important for raising awareness of the political issues promoted by 
protest movements. Indeed, as Lipsky (1968: 1151) points out “the communications media set the 
limits of protest action.” The effectiveness of protest directed at raising public awareness, changing 
attitudes or influencing policy therefore relies upon the extent to which it is able to draw attention 
to the public spectacle of rallies, marches, sit-ins, meetings and riots – and sustain that attention in 
future time periods. Such protest events underpin the captivating and contagious power of political 
conflict, famously observed by Schattschneider (1960). The question of why some protests are 
able to secure and sustain coverage on the agenda is crucial for understanding the opportunities 
open to social movements and interest groups who wish to influence the decision-making agenda. 
In this paper we have argued that the agenda-setting power of street demonstrations must be 
understood with reference to their context, and that this influence on the societal agenda is 
structured in time. Departing from protest event studies, which use protest as a unit of analysis 
(often as a dependent variable), we have compared and contrasted newspaper coverage associated 
with nearly fifty large street demonstrations in nine countries. We find that coverage of protest 
issues is sustained over time. It might be expected that it is hard for a demonstration to impact 
issue coverage beyond the immediate episodic timeframe, as the protest signal is lost amidst the 
multitude of other, new information signals. Our novel approach to modelling the dynamic effects 
of protest on media agendas uses protest issues as the dependent variable. This enables us to 
develop and find support for our theory of the dynamic relationship between demonstrations and 
coverage of protest issues. Differing from existing studies, our use of news coverage as a 
dependent variable and time series modelling allows us to show that demonstrations can have an 
enduring impact on media agendas, lasting several weeks beyond the protest event.   
Using time series cross-sectional analyses we find that demonstrations increase media coverage of 
protest issues but also that this effect decays quickly over time, so the time window for exerting 
pressure on the media agenda is short. In terms of the demonstration context, we find that 
demonstration size and the aggressiveness of police and demonstrators lead to increased media 
coverage. This is consistent with Schattschneider’s (1960) argument regarding the contagion of 
conflict and its agenda-setting power in widening the scope of (issue) conflict. In line with 
Schattschneider, we also anticipated that demonstrations would have a larger impact in mobilizing 
the media agenda on issues that are more heavily contested. It is therefore surprising that the 
presence of a counter-demonstration significantly reduced media coverage of protest issues in the 
longer-term. One possible explanation may be that social conflict is not fully captured by the 
staging of a counter demonstration. A counter-demonstration might not be observed on the day 
of a demonstration even when a counter movement is active. To address this limitation, future 
research might combine our approach with measurement of contextual information about inter-
group conflict and sectional interests. Nonetheless, we have marked a new direction in this field 
by theorising and illustrating that the effects of contextual variables on the agenda-setting power 
of protest are structured in time. The effect of demonstration size and aggressiveness is greatest 
on the media agenda during the week during or following the protest itself, suggesting a short-
lived spike in media attention. In the weeks following the protest, however, more aggressive 
behavior by police and protestors depresses the level of media coverage of the protest issue, 
though this effect dissipates over time.  
Our work makes a contribution to the social movements and protest literature because it allows 
for a more nuanced understanding of the notion of “discursive eruption” (Gaby and Caren 2016). 
Gaby and Caren (2016) suggested that the protest events of radical organisations have an indirectly 
positive effect on sustained newspaper coverage. Our findings offer modest support for this, but 
with the nuance that violence and/or aggression can lessen the potential for “discursive eruption”, 
even if violence and aggression lead to a media attention spike in the short-term.  There is potential 
to build yet further on our work by comparing the media agendas of different types of protest. We 
focused on large-scale protests and we expect that strikes, boycotts, riots and other forms of offline 
and online protest will generate and sustain coverage differentially. Nonetheless, violence, 
aggression, size and social contestation can be expected to affect coverage of different forms of 
protest in similar dynamic ways. A violent strike, for example, might generate media attention in 
the short-term, though will likely be followed by a rapid decline. Moreover, our findings suggest 
the potential for further work that takes a dynamic approach to the relationship to the interplay 
between protest and media agendas. Just as protest influences the media agenda, it is altogether 
feasible that the media agenda also influences the degree and type of protest (giving rise to positive 
feedback processes whereby media coverage leads to further protest on an issue). Overall, our 
findings demonstrate both that context matters for the influence of protest over the media agenda, 
but also that this influence is dynamic, not static.  
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Appendix 1. Description of Variables 
 
Dependent variables 
Media coverage to general protest issue: the number of newspaper articles identified during a given 
week based on a search of terms related to the general theme of the demonstration. Where a 
protest addresses multiple issues, we use the total number of articles to capture the overall size of 
the media agenda. 
 
Independent variables 
Media tone: coders assigned a score for the overall negativity of newspaper coverage of the 
demonstration in the sampled articles. Specifically, the coders were asked “… how would you 
describe the coverage of the demonstration in general?” where the possible responses were 
“Largely positive/sympathetic” (1), “Largely neutral and descriptive” (2), “Largely 
negative/unsympathetic” (3), “Largely a mixture of negative, positive and neutral” (4), “Largely a 
mixture of negative and positive” (5), “Largely a mixture of negative and neutral” (6) and 
“Largely a mixture of positive and neutral” (7). We recoded this variable on a scale from 1 to 5, 
such that positive coverage [1] was equal to 1, positive-neutral coverage [7] was equal to 2, mixed 
or neutral coverage [2, 4, 5] was equal to 3, negative-neutral coverage [6] was equal to 4, and 
negative coverage [3] was equal to 5. 
Demonstration size: the size of demonstration was calculated as the average of the police, media 
and researchers’ estimates of the number of participants.  
Counter-demonstration: this was coded as equal to 1 if there was a counter-demonstration and 0 if 
there was not. 
  
Appendix 2. List of demonstrations  
1 Climate Change (Brussels) 
2 March for Work (Brussels) 
3 No to Austerity (Brussels) 
4 No Government, Great Country (Brussels) 
5 Non-Profit Demonstration (Brussels) 
6 Not in Our Name (Brussels) 
7 We have alternatives (Brussels) 
8 Prague Pride (Prague) 
9 Stop the Government (Prague) 
10 The End of Godfathers (Prague) 
11 Climate March (Copenhagen) 
12 Anti Nuclear Manifestation (Beznau) 
13 Anti-nuclear (Mühleberg) 
14 Retirement demonstration (Rotterdam) 
15 Climate demo (Utrecht) 
16 Student demo 1 (Amsterdam) 
17 Culture demo Amsterdam (Amsterdam) 
18 Culture demo Utrecht (Utrecht) 
19 Student demo 2 (The Hague) 
20 Together strong for public work (The Hague) 
21 Anti Nuclear demo (Amsterdam) 
22 Military demo (The Hague) 
23 Stop budget cuts (care & welfare) (The Hague) 
24 Occupy Netherlands (Amsterdam, Utrecht, Rotterdam) 
25 Demonstration against language decree (Santiago de Compostela) 
26 Against the Europe of Capital, Crisis and War (Barcelona) 
27 Demonstration Against Abortion (Madrid) 
28 1st May, Labour Day (Barcelona) 
29 Demonstration against the new labour law (Santiago de Compostela) 
30 We are a nation, we decide (Barcelona) 
31 Against Labor Law (Madrid) 
32 Celebration May Day  (Vigo) 
33 Real Democracy Now! We are not good in the hands of politicians and bankers! (Madrid) 
34 May 1 March, Left Party (Stockholm) 
35 May 1 March, Social Democratic Party (Stockholm) 
36 Against racist politics (Stockholm) 
37 Anti-nuclear demonstration (Stockholm) 
38 May Day (Left Party) (Malmö) 
39 May Day (SAP/LO) (Malmö) 
40 May Day (Left Party) (Gothenburg) 
41 May Day (Social Democratic Party/LO) (Gothenburg) 
42 Rainbow Parade (LGBTQ festival) (Gothenburg) 
43 Women demonstration Geneva (Geneva) 
44 National Climate March (London) 
45 May Day Labour March (London) 
46 Take Back Parliament (London) 
47 Million Women Rise (London) 
48 'TUC's March for the Alternative: Jobs, Growth, Justice (London) 
 
